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Abstract: 
This thesis is based on a recently published meta-analysis of Katja Rost 
and Margit Osterloh which compiles the huge amount of empirical work 
on pay-for-performance for executives. The authors describe 
performance pay as a long-standing management fashion that has not 
achieved its goals. Rost and Osterloh found the link between pay and 
performance to be negligible and interpret there results as proof of the 
failure of pay-for-performance. 
This thesis is a critical evaluation of this argument. The first part 
describes the main problem of the modern corporation as the basis of 
today’s executive compensation schemes. Subsequently, the 
determinant components of executive pay as well as their strength and 
weaknesses are summarized. This critical analysis should reveal where 
the underlying problems are located. Furthermore, the empirical 
methods used in the works on which the study is based will be 
analysed in order to clarify the fundamental structural difficulties 
inherent in such investigations. In addition, the thesis deals with the 
question of whether the results (which are primarily based on US data) 
can be transferred to any given national economy and whether 
additional factors are then involved in the evaluation of a pay-
performance relationship. Finally, a review of the behavioural impacts 
of incentive compensation is presented. 
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Kurzzusammenfassung: 
Die vorliegende Arbeit basiert auf einer kürzlich veröffentlichten 
Metastudie von Katja Rost und Margit Osterloh, welche versucht, die 
große Anzahl an Empirie im Zusammenhang mit leistungsabhängiger 
Entlohnung von Führungskräften zusammenzufassen. Die Vergütung 
nach Leistung wird von den Autoren als ein bereits langanhaltender, 
aber gescheiterter Management-Trend bezeichnet. Dieses Argument 
wird für Rost und Osterloh durch die Ergebnisse ihrer Metastudie 
bestätigt, in der sie lediglich einen unwesentlichen Zusammenhang 
zwischen Leistung und Entlohnung feststellen konnten. 
Diese Arbeit versteht sich als kritische Auseinandersetzung mit dieser 
Rechtfertigung. Zu Beginn wird das Hauptproblem der modernen 
Aktiengesellschaft aufgezeigt, da es die Grundlage für die bestehenden 
Entlohnungsmodelle bildet. In weiterer Folge werden die einzelnen 
Komponenten der heutigen Managervergütung und ihre Vor- und 
Nachteile beleuchtet. Hier wird deutlich, wo sich die Grundproblematik 
befinden mag. Die Analyse der Empirie, die der Metastudie zugrunde 
liegt, bildet den Hauptteil. Dabei wird insbesondere auf die 
Schwierigkeiten und strukturellen Unterschiedlichkeiten hingewiesen. 
Darüber hinaus beschäftigt sich diese Arbeit mit der Frage, ob die, 
vorwiegend dem US-amerikanischen Markt zugrundeliegenden 
Ergebnisse, auch auf andere Wirtschaftsräume übertragbar sind und 
welche Faktoren dann auf den Zusammenhang zwischen Leistung und 
Entlohnung Einfluss nehmen. Abschließend werden 
verhaltensspezifische Auswirkungen dieser Entlohnungsform diskutiert. 
 
Schlagworte: 
Leistungsentlohnung, Managementvergütung, Metastudie; 
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1. Introduction 
The current financial and economic crisis has again brought top 
management remuneration to the centre of attention. The sharp 
increase in executive remuneration during the 1990´s has only 
marginally been decelerated by the two heavy crisis of the 21st century. 
Data shows that this tremendous increase has mainly been driven by a 
change in compensation practices. Starting in the US, it can primarily 
be ascribed to the trend of equity-based compensation that has led to 
the dramatic boost of executive compensation (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Average CEO Compensation in S&P 500 Firms1 
 
 
Note: Total compensation includes cash payment, long-term incentive plans and stock options 
 
Although the US represents the outrider of this trend, it is not limited 
to the United States. Actually the question about an Americanisation of 
                                            
1 Source: Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004), p. 25 
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executive compensation has arisen.2 While for a long time praised as 
the main solution to overcome the problems of the separation of 
control and ownership in the modern corporation, the tendency towards 
pay-for-performance has raised a lot of criticism as well. Corporate 
scandals like Enron, WorldCom or Tyco have disclosed the dark side of 
executive pay structures, which, though, has not led to a substantial 
trend reversal. The financial crisis, which started in 2007, could have 
lent support to a reconsideration of executive compensation throughout 
the world. Highlighted in the media, excessive CEO pay and rewards for 
failing executives, has resulted in public outrage. More than ever it 
seems as top-level pay is an issue for policy makers and legislation.3 
 
The amount of research on pay-for-performance has grown steadily 
since the beginning of the new century and today doubt about the 
effectiveness of executive remuneration practices is prevalent. In the 
recently published study by Katja Rost and Margit Osterloh, a meta-
analysis is used to summarize the huge amount of work on this topic. 
Generally based on the US, they argue, that pay-for-performance as a 
management fashion has not proven to be the promised tool to solve 
the agency problem.4 
 
The principal-agent problem, as the primary basis of contemporary 
compensation schemes, will occupy the first part of this thesis. 
Corporations today are faced with the problem that, due to the lack of 
perfect contracts, monitoring and incentives are necessary to align the 
interests of shareholders (company owners) and managers.5 Linking 
pay to corporate performance is aimed at solving the agency problem 
of moral hazard. Interestingly, empirical results, as those of Rost and 
                                            
2 Cf. Cheffins (2003) 
3 Cf. Ferrarini, Moloney and Ungureanu (2009) 
4 Cf. Rost and Osterloh (2009) 
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Osterloh, have not supported the application of the agency model to 
executive remuneration. 
                                                                                                                                    
5 Cf. Fong and Tosi, (2007) 
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2. Agency Theory  
2.1 The Common View 
Pay-for-Performance is generally based upon the agency theory. The 
separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation lead to a 
classical agency relationship where the shareholders (the principal) 
want the manager (the agent) to act on their behalf, and in their best 
interests. This may not always be the case, as the attitudes towards 
risk taking, size of the firm, how much effort to exert and how much 
leisure time to enjoy may vary greatly between the two parties. The 
principal cannot observe all actions taken by the agent due to 
asymmetric information. 
 
Agency theory assumes that humans are self-interested individuals and 
act in a way to maximize their personal utility. As the utility for 
managers might be higher pursuing other goals than maximizing 
shareholder wealth, a conflict of interests occurs that could only be 
solved by complete contracts. In the absence of such contracts agency 
costs arise. Referring to Jensen, and Meckling (1967) agency costs 
consist of  
 Monitoring costs by the principal 
 Bonding expenditures by the agent and 
 The residual loss 
 
Both the principal and the agent have incentives to reduce these costs. 
6 
 
Performance-based pay is not the only instrument to overcome the 
conflicts of interest between owners and the manager. Agency theory 
predicts that, in addition to incentive providing remuneration contracts, 
                                            
6 Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling (1976), p.5-6. 
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monitoring by large shareholders and the board of directors, equity 
ownership by executives, the market for corporate control, and the 
managerial labor market cooperate to align the interests of managers 
with those of shareholders.7  
 
2.2 Possible Shortcomings of the Agency View 
Taking a closer look at the above mentioned governance systems, 
critics have found various obstacles in the official view. Large 
shareholders have the time, the financial resources, and the interest, 
to monitor the CEO. However, they can rarely be found in modern 
corporations except for continental Europe, and the goals of large 
blockholders may differ from those of minority shareholders, as well.8 
Corporate governance codes around the world emphasize the 
monitoring role of the board of directors. However, the literature 
contains serious debates about the effectiveness of boards as 
supervisors. Critics argue that board members (especially independent 
directors) may not have the time and information to effectively monitor 
the CEO.9 
 
It is again the board that is responsible for the CEO pay setting. Thus, 
it is the role of the board of directors to work out contracts with the 
manager and consequently provide the right incentives for them to 
increase performance. Nowadays remuneration committees, which are 
comprised of mainly independent directors, undertake this task; 
however, this is no guarantee that CEO contracts are set in the right 
way to increase shareholder value. Researchers have listed a number 
of factors providing doubt about the fact that boards are bargaining at 
                                            
7 Cf. Balsam, Michael (2002) 
8 Cf. Thomsen, Steen (2005) 
9 Cf. Bebchuk, Fried (2004) 
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arm’s length with CEOs over their pay.10 Although in principle based on 
US companies, these problems can easily be transferred to two-tier 
board systems as well. 
 
First, directors have financial incentives to favor the CEO. They want to 
be reelected to the board, which ensures them a certain income and 
additional benefits. Although elected by the shareholders, the CEO 
keeps decisive influence in the nomination process of directors.11 CEOs 
might benefit directors directly or indirectly due to their power and 
influence. Although listing requirements impede the use of certain 
actions, it is still common that, for instance, non-profit organizations 
headed by a director receive considerable donations.12 
 
Other subjects of heated debate are interlocking directorates, where 
the CEO of company A sits on the board of company B and vice versa. 
Contributing to the financial incentive theory is the fact that CEO 
overpayment leads to overpayment at lower levels, which does not 
provide motivation for part of the work force to fret about excessive 
CEO pay. The link between executive and directors’ compensation has 
been proven in various studies already.13 
 
Beside the above mentioned, mainly financial reasons, there might well 
also exist psychological and social reasons for directors to bargain less 
aggressive with CEOs over their pay. Directors may have the support of 
the CEO to become a board member. Very often they are friends or a 
relationship based on loyalty has evolved over time. The perception of 
                                            
10 Cf. Bebchuk, Fried (2004) 
11 Cf. Hermalin, Weisbach (1998) 
12 Cf. Bebchuk, Fried (2004) 
13 Cf. Wade, O‘Reilly and Pollock (2006); Brick, Palmon and Wald (2002) 
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the CEO as a person to respect and as an authority might also lead to a 
departure from optimal contracting.14 
 
As board members are lacking time and information, it is no surprise 
that the use of compensation consultants is becoming more and more 
popular. Among the Fortune 250 companies about one-half are making 
use of outside advisors.15 In many cases it is the head of the human 
resource department who is responsible for the hiring of compensation 
consultants. And again, it is his boss, the CEO, who actually employs 
those advisors. Therefore, it can be doubted that compensation 
consultants will vigorously try to limit CEO compensation.16 
 
2.3 The Market-based View 
In light of the managerial power theory discussed above, which 
includes captive boards, it might be left to the market to disciplines 
managers in their “rent-seeking” behavior. One part of the story 
identifies the market for corporate control as an important means to 
align the interests of shareholders and managers. The basic idea is that 
managers in publicly traded companies cannot ignore the value of 
company stock, as a low stock value would make his/her firm a 
possible takeover target. A low stock value might signal poor 
management. Therefore the bidder might consider being able to 
manage the target firm more effectively, and the former management 
might be replaced.17 
 
According to Fama (1980), the market for corporate control contributes 
far less to the enhancement of disciplining effects for managers, than 
                                            
14 Cf. Bebchuk, Fried (2004) 
15 Cf. URL: http://www.workforce.com/section/00/article/25/35/31.html [Nov., 11th 2009] 
16 Cf. Jensen, Murphy, Wruck (2004) 
17 Cf.URL: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/MarketforCorporateControl.html [Nov., 12th 2009] 
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the managerial labor market does. On the one hand, managers monitor 
themselves top-down and bottom-up internally. Interestingly, Fama 
mentions the possibility for lower managers to benefit by identifying a 
shirking or incompetent superior.  This clearly runs counter to the 
above mentioned friendship and loyalty argument.18 On the other hand, 
it is the external market for managers which might price managers to 
their performance. 
 
The managerial power theory may not explain the increase in CEO pay 
considering that boards are becoming more and more independent and 
that the number of externally hired managers (less united with the 
board) steadily increases.19 
 
2.4 Additional Discussion 
The discussion above is crucial for answering the question of whether 
performance pay works. In fact, pay-for-performance is based on the 
idea that governance structures make it possible to overcome agency 
problems, and that the goals of shareholders and managers can be 
aligned through an incentive-based form of compensation. The 
managerial power approach makes CEO pay a function of its power to 
capture the board and the lack of complete contracts, which is clearly 
in opposition to the former view. 
 
In this context it is important to note that a common use of 
benchmarking can be observed in today’s compensation setting 
process. Peer groups generally include companies in the same industry 
and similar in size.20 Benchmarking has often been used as an 
explanation for the CEO pay explosion. Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen 
                                            
18 Cf. Fama (1980) 
19 Cf. Murphy, Zabojnik (2004) 
20 Cf. Faulkender, Yang (2007) 
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(2008) found that the majority of companies set CEO pay at or above 
the 50th percentile and some even try to keep it above median of the 
peer group, which results in a ratcheting effect. Their study found that 
compensation of CEOs who are paid below the median of their peer 
group rises more than the pay of CEOs who are above the peer group. 
Nevertheless, their sampling also showed that this is less likely in case 
of poor performance. Their results are inconsistent with the frequent 
view that benchmarking produced compensation packages that are 
independent of firm performance. 
 
Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen cite a recommendation in “The Conference 
Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise” which 
consists of a number of current and former CEOs, that  
“…the Compensation Committee should exercise independent judgment 
in determining the proper levels and types of executive compensation to 
be paid unconstrained by industry median compensation statistics.”21 
 
Faulkender and Yang (2007) were the first to analyze benchmarking 
behavior after the Security and Exchange Commission issued new 
disclosure requirements in 2006 which made it necessary for 
companies to state: 
 “Whether the registrant engaged in any benchmarking of total 
compensation, or any material element of compensation, identifying the 
benchmark and, if applicable, its components (including component 
companies).” [August 29, 2006, SEC final rules 33-8732a, Item 
402(b)(2)(xiv)] 
 
They found that firms try to justify their high CEO pay by choosing a 
highly paid peer. Furthermore they argue that their results do not 
justify the high pay setting, but do they support the manipulation 
argument of Bebchuk and Fried (2004). 
 
                                            
21 Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen (2008), p.152 
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The model of comparison discussed above should be distinguished from 
the tournament or “superstar” model based on the works of Rosenbaum 
(1979) and Rosen (1981). This theory emanated from the motivation of 
managers to compete against each other for the position at the peak of 
the company which is rewarded by a much higher salary.22 Results 
concerning the tournament theory differ in the literature, as do the 
methods used. Arguments supporting this view are mainly based on 
the fact that CEO pay is generally much higher than what managers at 
the next hierarchical level receive.23 
 
                                            
22 Cf. DiPrete, Eirich and Pittinsky (2009) quoting Rosenbaum (1979) and Rosen (1980) 
23 Cf. O’Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988) 
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3. Incentive-based Compensation 
Before analyzing the research on this topic it might be necessary to 
mention the various incentive-based compensation components and its 
possible shortcomings. What at first sight seems obvious reveals a 
number of doubts at the second glance. Hereafter it will be 
demonstrated that the design of the various pay components definitely 
contributes to weather they produce the right incentives, or not.  
 
Compensation contracts generally consist of a base salary, bonuses 
(short- or long-termed) and long-term incentives (equity-based 
compensation). Often pensions, benefits and perquisites are granted 
additionally. Although salary usually consists of a fixed amount it can 
be renegotiated. The specific negotiation position may well rely on past 
performance and may therefore also present an incentive for 
executives to work hard. The subsequent investigation focuses on 
bonuses and equity-based incentives as the classical performance-
related pay components. Praised as the main solution to the principal-
agent problem, performance pay has in fact not replaced fixed 
compensation, but is actually paid additionally.24 
 
3.1 Bonuses 
During the financial crisis, annual bonuses have been the most widely 
discussed pay components. This form of compensation is pretty popular 
in the financial sector, which is where it all started. Critics argue that 
bonuses are in many cases much too short-term oriented. Thus, they 
induce managers to take higher risk, mainly believed to be the cause of 
the financial turmoil. At present politics call for a reformation of bonus 
plans to make them more dependent on long-term performance.25 
                                            
24 Cf. Rost and Osterloh (2009) 
25 Cf. URL: http://www.spiegel.de/lexikon/64258385.html [Dec., 30th 2009] 
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In general, a bonus is tied to one or more performance measurements, 
which might be financial measures like accounting earnings, stock price 
performance, or sales, as well as non-financial measures like market 
share, or customer satisfaction. In reality, there are few limitations to 
performance goals unless tax issues are concerned. In the US for 
instance, the tax deduction for pay components that are non-
performance based is limited to $ 1 million.26 The advantages of bonus 
plans over equity-based incentives are that they can be designed to 
reach specific operational goals and that these cash awards are 
generally more tangible and immediate to executives.27 
 
3.2 The Basic Problems With Bonuses 
Do bonuses offer the right incentives for executives to work hard? Much 
doubt has been expressed about the effectiveness of bonuses and their 
dubious excrescences. The basic question that compensation 
committees have to face is where to set the lower and/or upper 
bounds. Let us, as an example, take the growth of operating earnings 
per share as a parameter. The threshold under which no bonus is paid 
is 10%. If this growth rate is reached the executive is granted a bonus 
of 20% of his base salary. There will be an upper bound at 20% and 
until that rate the executive can reach up to 100% of base salary as a 
bonus. Initially there is the danger of setting the bounds to low or to 
high. Bounds that are set too low will not induce the executive to work 
hard. If bounds are set too high the risk increases that executives get 
frustrated and demotivated and not even try to reach the goals.  
 
Inasmuch as one year’s performance sets the threshold for next year’s 
parameters, some more problems may appear. Executives who have 
                                            
26 Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code 
27 Cf. Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) 
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reached the upper bound will find no motivation to further increase 
performance, as this might reduce their expected bonus for the next 
period. These issues are reflected in the manipulation of earnings by 
executives, a fact that has been proven empirically by various 
researchers28 and will be discussed in more detail later on. 
 
As Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) point out, performance standards 
in general, and there misuse in particular, can significantly increase 
shirking among executives.  The above-mentioned issue demonstrates 
the problem of using this year’s bonus as a basis for the performance in 
the next period. Managers themselves often determine target budgets 
for following periods. Thereby they benefit by trying to keep the targets 
as low as possible. 
 
If performance is compared to that of peer groups, standards provide 
incentives for executives to select “weak” peers. To overcome some of 
these problems, the authors suggest that these non-linear pay-
performance relations should be replaced by linear ones that allow for a 
negative bonus and have very high or no caps. This would as well 
contribute to solving the problem of executives trying to keep targets 
for the following year as low as possible. Linear designs of bonus plans 
make targets unneeded and internal performance standards that can be 
influenced by managers are avoided. 
 
Failing to create the right incentives not only weakens the pay-
performance link, but also destroys long-run firm value.29 While these 
problems seem obvious, Murphy ten years ago reported that, of a 
sample of 177 US companies, only 11% extensively used external 
                                            
28 Cf. Healy (1985), Brown (1999), as examples 
29 Cf. Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) 
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standards based on external peer groups, or a firm’s cost of capital, as 
well as timeless standards.30 
 
3.3 Bonuses and Performance 
Variable pay should reward managerial effort and be decoupled from 
market or industry changes that are beyond their control. If possible, 
bonuses should reflect performance of executives relative to peer 
groups as this would reduce windfall profits. But research has shown 
that in a majority of firms this is not the case.31 
 
Sometimes bonuses have other goals. Firms pay a retention bonus for 
the executive to stay with the company.32 Aimed as an incentive for 
CEOs to be employed with the corporation, it is independent of 
performance and a way of circumventing an increase in base salary. 
The same applies to “golden hellos” that often come in form of bonuses 
to attract some star manager.33 While compensation committees might 
try to limit such clauses due to section 162(m) of the tax code, other 
bonuses will be designed to meet with the tax deductibility 
requirements, although their performance enhancing purposes are 
doubtable. 
 
Often criticized are bonuses for acquisitions. Grinstein and Hribar 
(2004) analyzed mergers and acquisitions from 1993 to 1990 and 
indicate that about 40% of the acquiring firms paid out bonuses to 
their CEOs, mainly in form of cash. Those bonuses were not negligible 
and amounted to $14 million. They found that acquiring firm’s 
shareholders face substantial losses due to M&A’s. Their findings are 
                                            
30 Cf. Murphy (2000) 
31 Cf. Murphy (1998) 
32 Cf. Balsam (2002) 
33 Cf. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
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consistent with other studies which discovered that the larger the deal, 
the more shareholder value is destroyed. In many cases acquirers pay 
too much for their targets, leaving shareholders with a loss in stock 
price and the substantial payout to their CEO’s.34 Critics of these forms 
of bonuses argue that reasons for executives to engage in M&A’s are 
primarily empire building and the overconfidence about their ability to 
enhance the value of the target firm.35 
 
Indeed, many arguments exist to raise doubt about the effectiveness of 
equivocal bonus schemes to improve managerial performance. 
 
3.4 Equity-based Compensation 
Stock-based compensation – more than any other component of 
payment – provides incentives for executives to increase shareholder 
value in form of stock price increases. Equity-based pay comes mainly 
in form of restricted stock grants and stock options, which are both 
non-tradable. Primarily, equity compensation should align the interests 
of shareholders and managers, but, as evidence shows, it is often used 
to attract and retain executives. However the latter function only works 
in situations where stock prices are rising. Only then would the 
manager leave valuable options or shares behind which he/she might 
not want to be forfeited.36 
 
Basically, the quantity of stock-based compensation needs to reflect 
the risk that managers have to bear compared to a fixed cash inflow. 
Thus firms need to pay a premium to make up for the risk of this non-
                                            
34 Cf. Grinstein and Hribar (2004); Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003); Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
35 Cf. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
36 Cf. Balsam (2002) 
16 
tradable compensation. A main difficulty with equity-based 
compensation is the determination of its value to the recipient.37  
 
3.4.1 Stock Grants 
While in the US stock options are by far more widely used, 
nevertheless about 20% of US companies additionally grant company 
stock to their CEO’s.38 Compared to stock options they have no exercise 
price and therefore have value as long as the share price is above zero. 
Stock grants come in form of unrestricted or restricted stock and/or 
performance shares. Restrictions might be based upon longevity or the 
achievement of performance targets by the CEO. If the executive 
leaves the company too earlier, or does not meet the required 
performance level, the shares are forfeited. Restricted stock that aims 
at retaining the CEO for a period of time does not directly provide the 
CEO with incentives to improve performance. Basically he/she only has 
to stay in the job. The main purpose of unrestricted stock, therefore, is 
the increase of managerial ownership in the company.  
 
3.4.2 Stock Options 
Stock options are granted to executives to allow them to buy shares of 
stock of their company at a fixed “exercise price” over a pre-specified 
period of time. In general, options are not immediately exercisable but 
become “vested” after a certain performance target has been reached 
or after some time has passed. As soon as the options vest they can be 
exercised until a certain expire date, which normally lies within 10 
years from the grant date. In most of cases the exercise price equals 
the grant-date share price and unvested options are forfeited if the 
executive leaves the company. Replications of stock options are stock 
                                            
37 Cf. Guay, Core and Larcker (2003) 
38 Cf. Balsam (2002), based on ExecuComp data including S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap600  
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appreciation rights which pay the holder the difference between the 
current market price and the exercise price in form of cash and/or 
shares. 
 
As Jensen, Meckling and Wruck (2004) among others have shown, the 
granting of stock options became very popular in the US during the 
1990’s. From an average of $22 million in 1992 the value of stock 
options granted per company in the S&P 500 increased to $238 million 
by 2000. A common explanation is that companies are unaware of the 
true cost and value of options as no direct cash outlay is required.39 
 
Before 2005 stock options did not appear on the income statement as 
an expense. Feng and Tian (2009) reported that option expensing has 
indeed contributed to the decrease in the use of options. They 
attributed the decline in stock option grants from 2002 onwards to the 
fact that firms already prepared for the modification in accounting 
treatment. The tax treatment of stock options may as well have 
contributed to its popularity. Performance-based options are not 
subject to Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code and its limited 
tax deductibility of one million dollars. Besides, stock option grants 
offer the advantage of deferred tax deduction.40 
 
3.5 Equity-based compensation and Performance 
Rost and Osterloh doubt the effect of pay-for-performance in general, 
while the majority of economists believe in its power to provide the 
requested incentives, but hold the poor design structures responsible 
for its “failure”.41 The main mistake made by compensation committees 
was, and possibly is, that they grant too many options. Habib and 
                                            
39 Cf. Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) 
40 Cf. Guay, Core, Larcker (2003) 
41 Cf. Jensen, Murphy, Wruck (1998); Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
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Ljungqvist (2005) investigated stock option grants to CEO’s of US 
public companies from 1992 to 1997 and reported exactly that 
problem. They found that, all else being equal, shareholder value would 
be enhanced by reducing CEO option holdings. 
 
Some authors dealt with the issue of the timing of stock option grants. 
Yermack (1997) found abnormal stock price increases after grants of 
executive stock, and evidence from Aboody and Kasznik (2003) 
suggests that managers time the announcement of good news after a 
scheduled stock grant, while accelerating bad news before the grant 
date. 
 
In the light of the stock market boom of the late 1990’s it was 
especially the impact of windfalls, which was most frequently criticized 
about conventional option plans. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) have 
particularly emphasized this issue. They argue that standard, non-
indexed options make executives’ rewards dependent not only on their 
own performance, but also on overall market or industry effects. 
Favorable market conditions or falling interest rates may boost share 
prices and reward managers independently of their performance 
compared to peer groups. 
 
Of course, executives are exposed to negative shocks, as well. 
However, the negative scenario can at the worst make the option 
worthless, regardless of how poor the shares are performing. Positive 
shocks on the other hand can increase the value of an option by an 
unlimited amount.42 This suggests that incentive effects of underwater 
options, which lead to programs like re-pricing, replacement or buy-
outs, are questionable. 
 
                                            
42 Cf. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
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Table 1: US Firms Re-pricing Options, by Year43 
 
Year  Number of repricers  Firms repricing (%)  
1992 13 0.97 
1993 30 1.81 
1994 39 2.25 
1996 59 3.01 
1997 80 3.94 
1998 86 4.36 
1999 37 2.05 
2000 6 0.58 
 
Re-pricing denotes the resetting of the exercise price of out-of-the 
money options. The re-pricing of stock options limits the risk to CEO’s 
and might destroy their incentives. A motivation for re-pricing is to 
retain managers, as underwater options make it less costly for other 
firms to hire them away.44  
 
Since December 1998 re-priced options in US companies have incurred 
an accounting expense. Carter and Lynch (2001) found that firms 
accelerated re-pricing stock options around that date and made less 
use of this method after the change in accounting treatment.45 At first 
sight, the data in Table 1 supports their findings. A sudden drop in the 
use of re-pricing after 1998 suggests that firms indeed tried to avoid 
these additional expenses. Other explanations for the drop include the 
life extension of options or the more frequent option grants.46 
 
                                            
43 Source: Balsam (2002) 
44 Cf. Guay,  Core, Larcker (2003) 
45 Cf. Carter and Lynch (2001) 
46 Cf. Balsam quoting Leonhardt (2000) 
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Sometimes out-of-the-money stock options are replaced by other forms 
of remuneration like stock grants or cash. These methods of rewarding 
the CEO for a loss in shareholder value are legitimated by some 
authors with the argument that long-term contracts can, and should be 
re-negotiated if a firm wants to retain the CEO.47 Indeed, conventional 
stock options reward or punish managers also for effects that are out of 
their control. The mentioned practices to handle underwater options do 
not contribute to a pay-performance relation, but reflect the problems 
of absolute performance measures which cryptically still represent the 
primary bases for stock option grants. 
 
3.6 How to Base Stock Options on Relative Performance 
Economic literature has presented a variety of ideas to decouple 
executive option gains from overall market effects. In practice 
however, the majority of firms has done little to change their stock 
option structure.48  
 
A simple approach to unwind stock options is the indexing of the 
exercise price to the average performance of market or sector 
benchmarks. Although this method may not remove all external 
influences it provides an easily adoptable form of relative performance 
measurement.49 An even less complicated form to avoid windfall profits 
is the use of performance-conditioned options. The exercise of these 
options depends on the attainment of certain performance targets. 
These targets can be indexes or other benchmarks like earnings per 
                                            
47 Cf. Guay, Core, Larcker (2003) quoting Saly (1994), Acharya (2000) 
48 Cf. Murphy (1998) 
49 Cf. Meulbroek (2001), who criticizes the incomplete method of linking exercise prices to indexes  and 
presents an alternative approach which ties the option to an appropriate performance-benchmarked portfolio 
with a fixed exercise price. 
21 
share or return on capital. If executives do not reach the performance 
targets the options forfeit.50 
 
The prevalence of conventional options is mainly attributed to their 
accounting treatment. Before 2005 companies in the US did not have 
to recognize an expense for “fixed” options under the FASB rules.  
Options were considered as fixed if the exercise price and the number 
of shares and the expiration date were known in advance. Indexed and 
performance conditioned options lacked these requirements. This was 
asserted to be the main explanation for the reluctance of firms to use 
variable options.51  
 
3.7 Decisions on Equity-Based Pay 
Considering the different incentives they provide for managers, it 
seems necessary to use both stock options and stock grants to balance 
managerial decision making. Stock options may induce CEO’s to take 
more risk, or to favor riskier investments, while stock grants have the 
opposite effect.52 The same conflict occurs in the decision of a manager 
to pay out dividends if non-dividend-adjusted options are granted. As a 
stock option holder, the executive will suffer a decrease in share value, 
while as a shareholder, he/she can pocket the dividend. It has indeed 
been proven that firms where executives hold a large amount of 
options pay lower dividends.53 
 
Apparently the prevailing methods of incentive-based executive 
compensation involve some doubt about their effectiveness to improve 
managerial performance. Changes in remuneration practices due to 
                                            
50 Cf. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
51 Cf. Balsam (2002); Bebchuk and Fried (2004)  
52 Cf. Guay (1999) 
53 Cf. Fenn and Liang (1999) 
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regulatory modifications are obvious, while some flawed compensation 
methods lack the necessary reforms. It is important to note that stock 
compensation depends on CEO-specific parameters like his/her wealth, 
diversification portfolio, and risk aversion,54 as well as on firm-specific 
factors like the investment policy or the level of dept.55  
                                            
54 Cf. Lambert, Larcker and Verrechia (1991) 
55 Cf. Choe (2001) 
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4. Empirical Evidence: A Review and Analysis 
Given the findings of the majority of past quantitative studies, it is no 
surprise that the Rost and Osterloh meta-analysis confirms once again 
the predominantly reported weak link between top management pay 
and company performance. Analyzing the 75 underlying studies, 
however, brings to light a variety of disparities with regard to methods, 
instruments, data sets or measures used. 
 
While most of the surveys focus on the CEO only, some consider the 
top five highest paid executives56 or even include lower level 
managers.57 The periods under investigation reach from 1940-196358 to 
the early years of the 21st century with the majority concentrated on 
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. All of the studies share the objective to 
identify possible determinants of executive compensation. Thus they do 
not necessarily or ostensibly aim on detecting a pay-performance 
relationship. They generally draw on the agency theory placing 
executive compensation as the dependent variable in their analyses. 
This indicates an ex post determination of pay according to prior 
performance.59 
 
On the other hand, studies investigating the influence of pay 
(independent variable) on performance (dependent variable) generally 
treat compensation as a motivational tool and therefore as the 
predictor rather than the predicted variable. The two approaches are 
based on differing theories and may be incompatible, but some believe 
that observations about their interrelatedness are important for 
                                            
56 Cf. e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) 
57 Cf. e.g. Werner and Tosi (1995) 
58 Cf. Lewellen (1968) 
59 Cf. Fama (1980) 
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understanding executive compensation.60 The following review focuses 
basically, but not exclusively, on the quantitative studies underlying 
the Rost/Osterloh meta-analyses. Later on I will refer to psychological 
and motivational theory as well. 
 
4.1 The Impact of Firm Performance on Managerial Pay 
Rost and Osterloh report an overall contribution of 0.64% of variable 
CEO income on firm performance and that cash-based, short-term 
plans have an influence on performance which is more than double that 
of equity plans (long-term). Moreover they found the pay-performance 
relation to diminish over time. The already only moderate correlation of 
pay and performance by 1950 further weakened till the year 2005 in 
their model. Although the authors quote various studies showing 
similar results, their findings do not run parallel with all executive 
compensation investigations. 
 
A study frequently mentioned as the seminal one is that of Jensen and 
Murphy (1990). Their work includes longitudinal data on executive 
compensation from 1974 to 1986 and a large sample of over 1,000 US 
corporations. They report an average change in CEO wealth of $3.25 
for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Jensen and Murphy 
furthermore found that the pay-performance relation has declined since 
the 1930s. But in contrast to Rost and Osterloh, who criticize the 
performance pay in general, they attribute the cutback to the 
decreasing fractions of firm shareholdings by the CEO.61 
 
The study cited most often by the majority of scholars contradicting the 
pay without performance results is the one by Hall and Liebman. Their 
findings are based on fifteen years panel data from the period of 1980 
                                            
60 Cf. Devers et al. (2007) 
61 Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
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to 1994 and included 478 of the largest US companies. They found the 
change of CEO wealth in relation to the change of shareholder wealth 
to be four times larger than reported by Jensen and Murphy (1990). 
Their results indicate that CEO wealth often changes considerably with 
changes in firm value. For example, they pronounce that the median 
total CEO compensation is $5 million if the firm’s stock has an 
seventieth percentile annual return (20.5 percent) while it is only $1 
million for the CEO of a firm that has a thirtieth percentile annual 
return (-7.0 percent). 
 
This example also demonstrates the differences in measuring the pay-
performance relation and in formulating the interrelation. These 
circumstances clearly hamper the comparability of the various findings.  
 
Hall and Liebman argue that the interpretation of the Jensen and 
Murphy sensitivity should account for the large denominator (market 
value) of a Fortune 500 firm. The change of CEO wealth seems small 
viewed in isolation. Again contrary to Rost/Osterloh or Jensen/Murphy 
their empirical results exhibit a pay-performance relation that increases 
over time. The elasticity of CEO pay relative to firm market value more 
than tripled from 1.2 in 1980 to 3.9 in 1994. The authors attribute this 
sharp increase to the rise of stock and stock option grants to CEOs.62 
This argument is frequently found in the executive compensation 
literature to support equity-based pay and its effect on the pay-
performance link.63 
 
                                            
62 Hall and Liebman (1998) 
63 Jensen and Murphy (1990) blame their small pay-performance sensitivity on the small fractional CEO 
stock holdings; Conyon and Murphy (2000) relate their findings of a higher pay-performance relation in the 
US than in the UK on the higher equity-based compensation of the former. 
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4.2 Common Research Construction 
Quantitative research has frequently employed Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) multiple regression models with executive compensation as the 
dependent variable and performance as the independent or control 
variable. Murphy (1998) presents how year-to-year pay changes due to 
performance changes are typically modeled. Researchers in general 
assume that time trends and pay-performance relations are constant 
across executives and therefore estimate: 
(CEO Pay)it = + (Performance)it. 
 
Studies need to consider (i) which CEO pay components to include (and 
if they should be measured in dollars or in logarithms), (ii) how to 
measure performance, and (iii) the lag structure. CEO pay may be 
measured in dollars or in logarithms. As regards the performance 
measure, researchers choose between dollar values and rates of return. 
These choices determine whether the regression coefficients are 
disclosed as “pay-performance sensitivities” or “pay-performance 
elasticities”. The main differences between these approaches are that 
sensitivity has a more natural economic interpretation but varies 
monotonically with size (higher sensitivity for smaller firms), whereas 
elasticities are comparatively invariant to firm size.64  
 
 The data on executive pay was in some cases provided by consulting 
firms or by the Forbes 500 list, but is primarily obtained from the 
“ExecuComp” database for the US, and from “Datastream” for the UK. 
Additional information is often drawn from proxy statements or annual 
reports. However, the use of predetermined measures from the above 
mentioned databases might constrain the analysis of executive 
compensation.65 For example, ExecuComp provides values for stock 
                                            
64 Cf. Murphy (1998) 
65 Cf. Farmer (2008) 
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options that are currently “in the money” only, thereby ignoring options 
that are slightly “out of the money” for the moment. The same holds 
true if the stock price jumps beyond the exercise price for the time 
reported only.66 Financial data (company performance data), in the 
reviewed literature, was predominantly obtained from the Standard and 
Poor’s Compustat database. 
 
4.3 Measuring Executive Compensation 
Farmer (2008) supposes that the inconsistent findings of a pay-
performance relation are, at least in part, a result of the inconsistent 
determination of the pay variable. Indeed, a great deal of the studies 
included in the meta-analysis only used cash compensation (salary + 
annual bonus) to determine executive pay. Some only include stock 
options for measuring long-term effects67, while others also account for 
stockholdings.68 Early or non US based works struggled with the 
availability of stock option data while the complexity of the valuation 
further limited the inclusion of long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) or 
stock options. It is presumed that the effect of equity compensation on 
performance measures like total shareholder return (TSR), or earnings 
per share (EPS), would have enhanced the pay-performance relation in 
studies that did not include long-term pay components.69 
 
On the other hand, even non-equity compensation in pay-performance 
studies might lack some unreported components like pensions, 
deferred compensation, post-retirement perks, consulting fees or loan 
arrangements. Critics of this “hidden” additional income for CEOs argue 
that it might further mitigate the already low performance enhancing 
                                            
66 Cf. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) 
67Cf. e.g. McKnight and Tomkins (1999) 
68 Cf. e.g. Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
69 Cf. Farmer (2008) 
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incentives of non-equity pay.70 Another weakness reported is that 
many works exclusively focus on total executive compensation instead 
of measuring the effect of the various components separately. Each pay 
component might be targeted at different performance goals and might 
be influenced by different factors.71  
 
4.4 Stock Option and LTIP Valuation 
Studies which include long-term compensation need to cope with the 
issue of how to value these grants. To deal with this uncertainty is not 
an easy task. The value of stock options plans, for example, depends 
on future firm performance, if the CEO stays with the company, and 
the CEOs risk preference.72 
 
4.4.1 The Black-Scholes model 
A common method used for their stock option valuations is the Black-
Scholes option pricing model. Although commonly used, this method 
has frequently been the subject of criticisms. The general opinion is 
that the Black-Scholes formula overstates the value of stock options 
because certain assumptions do not apply to executive option grants. 
 
First, stock options are normally non-transferable and do not yield 
constant dividends, nor a constant stock-price variance. Second, the 
Black-Scholes formula does not account for the possibility of forfeiture 
of the option if the executive leaves the firm prior to vesting. This 
reduces the cost of the option. Finally, the formula assumes that stock 
options can be exercised only at the maturity date. In fact, most 
                                            
70 Cf. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
71 Cf. McKnight and Tomkins (1999), Their work is one of few that measures short-term effects and long-
term effects separately. However, as mentioned above, they only included stock options in their valuation of 
LTIPs. 
72 Cf. Henderson and Fredrickson (1996) 
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options can be exercised upon vesting. On the one hand this increases 
the value of the option to outside investors which raises the option’s 
cost. But then the firm’s cost of the options is decreased by the 
tendency of risk-averse and undiversified executives to exercise much 
earlier than a rational investor would do.73 
 
4.4.2 Alternatives 
McKnight and Tomkins (1999) use the minimum share option valuation 
model (MSO). They argue that this method may possibly capture the 
personal value of options to the CEO more precisely. From the 
motivational perspective of incentive providing options it is essential to 
know, how the CEO values his/her gain from stock options. Indeed, 
McKnight and Tomkins have already touched on this issue by 
conducting interviews with about 60 executives of two multinationals. 
While it was difficult to draw clear conclusions out of the investigation 
due to complex psychological factors influencing CEO perception of 
gains, they found at least some justification not to employ the Black-
Scholes model. 
 
In fact, the authors found changes in the value of stock options to be 
significantly positively related to shareholder returns (coefficient 8.1, t-
value 8.8). Expressed in pounds sterling this means that executive 
stock option value increases by £1.07 for each £1,000 increase in firm 
value. Their results are surprising especially in comparison to findings 
of previous studies.74 Furthermore they emphasize the importance of 
considering different option valuation models and their implications on 
                                            
73 Cf. Kerr and Kren (1997); Murphy (1998); Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon (2005), who found in their sample 
that on average, employee stock options are exercised a little over two years subsequent to vesting and 
more than four years prior to expiration. 
74 Cf. McKnight and Tomkins (1999); Jensen and Murphy (1990), who report a pay-performance sensitivity 
of CEOs stock options of 15 cents per $1.000 change in shareholder return; Main, Bruce and Buck (1996), 
who found a 9 pence per £1.000 sensitivity. 
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the pay-performance sensitivity.75 The "heuristic” approach may 
however understate the true option value as no value is reported 
unless the market price of the stock exceeds the exercise price of the 
option.76 
 
Stock option values from proxy statements are either based on the 
Black-Scholes model or on a simpler formula provided by the Security 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), as only those two are allowed.  
Some researchers have used the present value formula of the SEC to 
determine stock option values.77 Others have just valued stock options 
at 25 percent of their exercise price and argue that this method 
produces similar results as more elaborated methods like the Black-
Scholes formula.78 
 
4.5 The Cost and Value of Options 
As already briefly mentioned, it is important to distinguish between the 
cost of the stock option to shareholders (objective value) and its value 
to the executive (subjective value). The knowledge of the former might 
be necessary for shareholders. As far as the incentive-providing 
character of executive stock options is concerned research should 
rather focus on the latter. However, as Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon 
(2005) argue, the purpose of stock option grants is not always clear. 
Besides the incentive effect, stock options might be granted instead of 
cash compensation by firms lacking liquidity. 
 
                                            
75 It should be noted that the authors explicitly mention that the results may be biased by the period under 
investigation, which was characterized by a continuous bull market. 
76 Cf. Kerr and Kren (1997) 
77 Cf. e.g. Carpenter, Sanders and Gregersen (2001) 
78 Cf. Henderson and Frederickson (1996) 
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The authors also examined the exercise behavior of executives by 
means of a large database and transformed their observations into a 
utility-based model which measures option values and option 
incentives alike. Subsequently they compared the valuation and 
incentive measures with those produced by models used to value 
standard tradable options. They found that if in the standard model the 
maturity is modified according to the expected time of exercise (which 
was found to be much earlier than the expiration date), option values 
were similar to those presented by the utility-based model. However, if 
early exercise is not adjusted for, it results in significant bias. 
 
Furthermore, Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon report that subjective values 
of stock options for executives lie approximately 20% under the 
objective values calculated, and vary with stock price volatility 
(decreasing in high volatility groups). Carpenter (1998) introduced an 
alternative for complex utility-based models. Her exogenous model 
accounts for early exercise and forfeiture but focuses only on the cost 
of options to shareholders and not on the value to executives.79  
 
Given the diverse methods used in stock option valuation it is no 
surprise that studies on executive compensation lack conformity. 
Furthermore, with regards to stock options the data content varies 
significantly as well. Most compensation measures in empirical works 
only include options granted during the year (e.g. Finkelstein and 
Hambick [1995], Carpenter, Sanders and Gregersen [2001], Frye, 
Nelling and Webb [2006], Grossman, Wayne and Cannella [2006], 
Coombs and Gilley [2005]). Others concentrated solely on option gains 
realized by the executive (e.g. Hallock [1997], Wade, Porac and Pollock 
[1997]). Some researchers have considered the payouts to executives 
plus the value of option grants during the year (e.g. Aggarwal and 
                                            
79 Cf. Carpenter (1998) 
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Samwick [1999], Roulstone [2001]), but only few studies also 
accounted for changes in the value of all outstanding stock options, like 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) did. 
 
Another source of discussion is the valuation of long-term incentive 
plans (LTIPs). Buck et al. (2003) define LTIPs as “grants of cash or 
shares (usually the latter) with performance conditions”. They also 
describe a methodology to determine the interim value of those grants 
for a particular year. At the same time, using a case study of HSBC, 
they provide an example for the possible complexity of LTIPs.80 The 
necessity of interim valuations is however questionable given the 
argument that the contingency of LTIPs on performance makes the 
gain for executives only “current” upon vesting and not at grant.81 
 
4.6 Determination of the Pay Variable 
Farmer (2008) explored the literature on executive compensation with 
regards to the measurement of executive pay and puts it as follows: 
“It is recognised that the range of definitions, calculations and valuation 
techniques used to measure chief executive compensation enriches the 
literature which must be beneficial; however, it may also be a reason for 
the inconsistent results reported in the chief executive pay-performance 
literature.”82 
 
He suggests the use of hand-collected data from annual reports, as 
then the measure can be adapted for the objective of the research. 
Furthermore he argues for the separation of executive compensation 
into its components (see e.g. McKnight, Tomkins [1999]), as each 
component might be influenced by different factors. Finally he presents 
the following framework for the determination of the dependent pay 
variable to be used in future quantitative studies: 
                                            
80 Cf. Buck, Bruce, Main and Udueni (2003) 
81 Cf. Farmer (2008) 
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(i) Data should be hand collected from the annual report and accounts 
to allow for the required flexibility to measure all components of 
compensation.  
 
(ii) Basic pay is to be measured as the annual salary/fees as reported 
in the directors’ remuneration report.  
 
(iii) Short-term incentive is to be measured as the annual paid bonus 
as reported in the directors’ remuneration report.  
 
(iv) Deferred cash compensation is to be measured at the time it is 
deferred if it is already earned and guaranteed. Otherwise at the point 
of vesting if further performance conditions are attached.  
 
(v) Performance options are to be measured as the value of share 
options vesting in the current year. Time-vested options are to be 
measured at grant.  
 
(vi) Performance shares are to be measured as the payout in the 
current year. Non-performance restricted shares are to be measured at 
grant.  
 
(vii) Cash value of benefits in kind, pension contribution and other cash 
are to be measured as reported in the directors’ remuneration report.  
 
(viii) Exclude saving plans as they constitute a personal investment.83 
 
                                                                                                                                    
82 Farmer (2008), p.11 
83 Farmer (2008), p.12 
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4.7 Measuring Firm Performance 
Kerr and Kren (1997) concluded that it is unclear which performance 
measures firms use to evaluate the CEO’s performance (skill and 
effort). 
However, scholars have tried to bring to light at least the objective 
performance criteria. Murphy (1998) for example, presents a Towers 
Perrin survey of bonus plans of 177 large US companies for 1996, 
divided by three industry groups. It was shown that while 68 firms only 
used a single performance measure, others already used multiplicative 
measures, where the bonus level for one criterion is contingent on the 
realization of another criterion.  
 
Firms mainly used some form of earnings to measure performance 
which includes net income, pre-tax net income, return on assets (ROA), 
return on equity (ROE) and return on capital (ROC). Operating profits 
like EBIT were frequently employed as well. Measures included dollar-
values as well as per share ratios like earnings per share (EPS). 
 
Except in the finance and insurance industry, corporations also used 
non-financial performance measures. Those came in form of 
performance relative to pre-specified goals, subjective evaluations, 
customer satisfaction, as well as operational and/or strategic objectives 
measures. Corporations in the sample used a variety of performance 
standards. Most frequently those standards were determined as (i) the 
company’s budget, (ii) prior year performance, (iii) peer group 
performance, or (iiii) they followed discretionary plans.84 
 
The accounting-based measures used in empirical studies generally 
reflect the above-mentioned criteria. From the variety of alternatives 
given, ROA or ROE are in general preferred throughout the literature. 
                                            
84 Cf. Murphy (1998) 
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 It is obvious that cross-sectional analyses are unable to account for 
the complexity of some bonus schemes in distinct corporations.  With 
regards to market-based performance measures the main focus of 
empirical studies lies on total shareholder return (TSR). According to 
the shareholder value theory of corporate governance it is the stock 
market performance which should be focused on. It seems plausible 
that high earnings positively affect stock prices; however, accounting-
based measures reflect current firm performance while stock prices 
reflect investors’ perception of future value. Therefore stock markets in 
general already incorporate anticipated earnings.85 In fact, 
investigations on the effect of earnings on market performance have 
reported mixed results.86 
 
A less commonly used performance measure is Tobin’s Q, defined as 
the market value of the firm divided by the replacement cost of its 
assets. Unavailability of input data has mainly contributed to the 
avoidance, or to the use of approximations of Tobin’s Q.87 The seminal 
work on this issue is the study by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) 
which examined the relationship between managerial stock holdings 
and performance measured as Tobin’s Q. They found performance to 
increase with managerial equity holdings between 0% and 5% and for 
board holdings in excess of 25%. Holdings between 5% and 25% lead 
to a negative effect on Tobin’s Q. Thus they document a non-linear 
relationship with the decrease of performance being less significant.88 
 
Tosi et al. (2000) critically discuss the use of archival databases 
resulting in proxy variables which reflect purely economically rational 
                                            
85 Cf. Devers et al. (2007) 
86 Cf. Wade, O‘Reilly and Pollock. (2006); Devers et al. quoting Core and  Larcker (2002), Morgan and 
Poulsen (2001) 
87 Cf. Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) 
88 Cf. Morck et al. (1988) 
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performance criteria. Those criteria may only cover part of the CEO’s 
job requirement and may therefore be imperfect. They further state, 
that 
“…the objective performance measures found in the executive 
compensation literature may be “deficient” for evaluation purposes by 
those responsible for corporate governance, who in turn then use a 
subjective evaluation process to assess the executive’s contributions. If 
this is the case, it would not be surprising that weak empirical 
relationships using archival-based criteria are found.”89 
 
They therefore question if the methodologies used, are in fact able to 
measure performance according to the agency contract. 
 
4.8 Corporate Governance Issues 
Various studies (some included in the Rost/Osterloh meta-analysis) 
engage in the corporate governance discussion. Empiricists typically 
include one or more of the following variables in their models: 
 
 Board Composition (proportion of outside directors on the board) 
 CEO Duality (the unity of the CEO/chairman of the board 
position) 
 Inside Ownership (proportion of firm’s stock owned by managers 
and directors) 
 Institutional Blockholdings (proportion of stock held by large 
outside investors: individuals, investment firms, mutual funds, 
pension funds etc.) 
 Presence of/ Proportion of Nonexecutive Directors on 
Remuneration Committees  
 
A common approach is to measure the effect of the miscellaneous 
governance variables on the level of CEO compensation.90 Some have 
                                            
89 Tosi et al. (2000) p.331 
90 Cf. e.g. Mangel and Singh (1993); Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999)  
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additionally explored their impact on the CEO pay mix. David et al. 
(1998) for example, reported that institutional owners - which have 
only an investment relationship with the firm – increase the proportion 
of long-term pay incentives in total compensation. Of course this does 
not necessarily induce a higher pay-performance relation (it was not an 
aim of the study either). Other scholars have included the effect of 
corporate governance variables on the pay-performance link by 
calculating interaction terms. Among the corporate governance 
literature these contributions are of special interest considering optimal 
incentive contracts. 
 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1995) document that in externally controlled 
firms (where a major non-manager blockholder does exist) changes in 
CEO pay were more positively related to changes in ROE than in 
manager-controlled firms (without a major blockholder). Conyon and 
Peck (1998) found for the UK that the pay-performance link 
(performance measured as total shareholder return) was significantly 
larger for firms with boards or remuneration committees consisting of 
more (equal or above 40 percent) nonexecutive directors. Again for the 
UK, and drawing on stock performance, Benito and Conyon (1999) 
reported only a modestly higher pay-performance relation for firms 
having installed a remuneration committee or split the role of the CEO 
and chairman. 
 
Apart from the Rost/Osterloh bibliography Kraft and Niederprüm (1999) 
documented for the German manufacturing industry that shareholder 
concentration negatively influenced the pay-performance link. Hartzell 
and Starks (2003) also examined the influence of institutional investors 
on executive pay by means of a large sample of US companies. They 
found that although large institutional ownership was negatively 
related to the level of managerial compensation, it increased pay-
performance sensitivity. They argue that their findings confirmed the 
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monitoring role of large blockholders which seems to mitigate the 
principal-agent problem. 
 
4.9 Additional Variables Included in Compensation Models 
4.9.1 Risk 
Researchers have commonly controlled for some sort of risk in their 
empirical works. However, they have seldom accounted for its various 
meanings and complexity. More precisely, empiricists have often used 
organizational risk as a proxy for managerial risk.91 The motivation to 
control for risk lies in the prediction of agency theory that high risk 
firms need to compensate their risk-averse executives for bearing this 
uncertainty.92 
 
Scanning the literature shows that scholars have frequently employed 
stock volatility, or the variance of total returns as proxies for firm risk. 
Cordeiro and Veliyath (2003) for example, additionally controlled for 
firm diversification. Diversification generally raises firm complexity. 
 
According to Palmer and Wiseman (1999) complexity refers to one of 
the environmental factors which in turn influence organizational risk. In 
contrast, they argue that the change in diversification is attributed to 
the strategic choices of executives which are associated with 
managerial risk. They concluded that although managerial risk taking 
influences firm risk it is essential to examine these variables in 
isolation and to understand their causal relationship. However, 
evidence on methodological considerations of this issue is scarce.93  
 
                                            
91 Cf. Palmer and Wiseman (1999) 
92 Cf. Cordeiro and Veliyath (2003) 
93 Cf. Devers et al. (2007) 
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In general, agency theory predicts that the pay-performance sensitivity 
decreases with the variance of firm performance. This has been 
confirmed by various studies. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) for 
example, underlined the importance of performance variability as a 
determinant of compensation and the pay-performance verification. 
They further documented that the omission to account for this variance 
results in estimates of the pay-performance sensitivities that are 
biased towards zero. Findings of Kraft and Niederprüm (1999) 
supported the negative relations between firm risk and pay-
performance sensitivity for Germany as well. 
 
4.9.2 Time 
The importance of time is not limited to the point in time or period in 
which a study was conducted (issues in this context have been 
mentioned above), but also with regards to methodologies used in 
empirical analysis. 
 
The studies reviewed here diverge in their use of lags for the various 
variables (specifically for pay and performance).  The very early 
contribution of McGuire, Chiu and Elbing (1962) documented that 
managers are not only compensated for current, but also for past 
performance. However, they could not significantly identify a 
dominating lag. Since that time, the inconsistence on this issue has 
remained. 
 
The timing of the various pay components contributes to the difficulty 
of the lag determination. Stock options for example, may in some 
cases be scheduled in advance. Thus, executives may have mentally 
accounted for option grants in time t-1 for grants taking place in time 
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t.94 Considerations of time within the pay-performance literature are 
certainly subject to change with modifications of compensation 
schemes. For instance, in the aftermath of the financial crisis bonuses 
may discontinue as measures for short-term incentives only, as their 
performance valuations become more and more long-term. 
 
4.10 Firm Characteristics and the Pay-Performance Relation 
4.10.1 Size 
Firm size has been shown to be the main driver of managerial pay. Tosi 
et al. (2000) attributed 40% of variance of CEO compensation to 
differences in company size while performance contributed less than 
5%. On the other hand, the sensitivity of pay for changes in size was 
similar to that for changes in performance (5% and 4% respectively of 
the explained variance in pay). 
 
Schaefer (1998) documented that the Jensen and Murphy pay-
performance sensitivity decreases with firm size, which implies that 
“the value of providing incentives for effort does not increase with size 
as fast as the cost of risk bearing by the executive.”95 Murphy (1998) 
reported that the media pay-performance sensitivity of S&P Mid Cap 
($15.38 per $1,000) and Small-Cap firms ($28.23 per $1,000) far 
outperforms that of the largest half of the S&P 500 ($4.36 per $1,000). 
He argues that the findings are not surprising given the small fractional 
stock ownership managers have of these large corporations. The 
increase in size is clearly accompanied by a rise in agency costs. This 
trade-off requires attention and delivers a crucial argument for the 
consideration of firm-size heterogeneity in comparative studies. 
 
                                            
94 Cf. Devers et al. (2007) 
95 Schaefer (1998) p.436 
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From a shareholder value view it is extremely important to determine 
the effect of firm size on managerial pay and the incentives involved. 
Managers might be interested in “empire building” which would 
enhance her/his prestige, power and pay, and involves actions that 
might decrease shareholder value (e.g. unfavorable acquisitions).96 
 
4.10.2 Industry 
Executive pay structures vary heavily between industries and so do 
pay-performance sensitivities. As mentioned above, the main focus of 
the reviewed research on executive compensation lies on indexes or 
other lists including the largest corporations of the United States. 
Though comparison is certainly demanding, it might be necessary to 
consider incentive alignment differences among various industries, 
particularly in consideration of the inconsistency to control for industry 
pay in quantitative works.97 
 
The literature delivers various examples of studies addressing only a 
single industry. The advantage of the restriction on a specific industry 
eliminates the variations due to cross-industry differences.98 Hermalin 
and Wallace (2001) surveyed executive compensation and firm 
performance in the savings and loan industry. Mehran (1994) focused 
on manufacturing firms, Rajagopalan (1996) on electric utility 
companies and Veliyath (1999) on the pharmaceutical industry. Those 
studies vary in their methodological structure, objectives and 
measures, which reflects the comparability issue touched on above. 
 
                                            
96 See Tosi et al. (2000) for a detailed review of the literature in this context 
97 Cf. Veliyath (1999), who argues that not controlling for industry differences may represent a main 
weakness of executive compensation studies. I found that empiricists commonly, but not entirely, controlled 
for it. 
98 Cf. Veliyath (1999) 
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Hallman and Hartzell’s study (1999) will be mentioned in more detail 
as their employment of the Jensen and Murphy (1990) pay-
performance sensitivity allows for some comparison with earlier 
documented results. The authors compared the compensation of 
managers of real estate investment trusts (REITs) to the compensation 
of general partners of real estate limited partnerships (RELPs). Thus, 
they were the first to empirically investigate pay-performance 
relationships between different organizational forms. They argue that 
managers of REITs and general partners of RELPs perform similar jobs 
with the main difference that firing general partners is more costly.  
Their results reflect the assumption that, due to the poor termination 
incentives for general partners of RELPs, their compensation is much 
more closely tied to performance. The change in wealth for general 
partners was $253.57 per $1,000 change in the value of limited partner 
shares, while REIT managers’ change was $25.30 per $1,000 change in 
shareholder value.99 
 
Figure 2 presents pay-performance sensitivities from Murphy (1998) for 
S&P 500 firms divided by four major industries. What clearly emerges 
is the fact that regulated utilities exhibit far lower than average pay-
performance sensitivities. Furthermore, industries other than financial 
services, mining and manufacturing produce higher changes in CEO 
wealth in connection with changes in shareholder wealth. Moreover, the 
graph presents a trend towards rising pay-performance sensitivities for 
the period under investigation. 
                                            
99 Hallman and Hartzell used a simulation methodology to calculate the pay-performance sensitivity for 
general partners of RELPs 
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Figure 2: Median Pay-Performance Sensitivities for S&P 500 
CEOs, by Industry, 1992-1996100 
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Note: Included are all S&P 500 firms. Manufacturing include firms with 2-digit SIC codes 10-29; financial 
services 60-69, and utilities 49. 
 
4.11 CEO turnover 
Theory suggests that besides incentive contracts, the threat of 
dismissal represents another strong force to discipline managers and to 
make them act in order to increase shareholder value. Literature on 
CEO turnover therefore is increasing and is already manifold. In the 
most effective case CEOs are dismissed following poor firm 
performance. Indeed, early US studies reported a negative relation 
between CEO turnover and company performance, arguing that their 
                                            
100 Source: Murphy (1998), p.83 
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findings are consistent with principal-agent theory.101 Empiricists 
documented similar results for the UK and for Germany.102 CEO 
turnover is not tantamount to CEO dismissal, but it is typically not 
possible to exactly distinguish between fires, quits and retirements.103 
In fact, the early studies mentioned above note that the reasons 
behind executives’ dismissals for poor performance are rarely specified. 
Murphy (1998) argues that in the 1990s the situation has somehow 
changed. He mentions various cases of forced resignations that were 
openly discussed. 
 
Evidence indicates that the CEO turnover rate is increasing as well. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) documented that during their thirteen-year 
sample average CEO tenure was more than ten years. A more recent 
study by Kaplan and Minton (2006) registered, as well for large US 
companies, that CEOs between 1992 and 1998 on average held their 
job for less than seven years, and more recently, between 1998 and 
2005 for less than six years (see Figure 3). Moreover they found a 
strong and significant relation between stock performance and internal 
turnover (board driven), but no significant results for the link between 
performance and external turnovers (following M&As). They also find 
turnover-performance sensitivities to increase in block shareholder 
ownership, board dependence and Sarbanes-Oxley act.104  
 
 
                                            
101 Cf. Coughlan and Schmitt (1985); Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988); Weisbach (1988); Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) 
102 Cf.  Cosh and Hughes (1997); Conyon (1998); Kaplan (2006) 
103 Cf. Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
104 Cf. also Weisbach (1988), who was the first to report that CEO dismissal for poor performance is 
enforced if boards are predominantly composed of independent outside directors. 
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Figure 3: Annual Internal and Total CEO Turnover, Fortune 500 
from 1992-2005 by Sub-period105 
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Thus, these findings confirm the notion of other researchers that 
corporate governance improvements raised CEOs’ threat of dismissal 
following poor performance. 
 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) address the importance of penalties if a 
manager is dismissed. They note that even a low probability of 
termination can provide the right incentives for managers as long as 
they are punished hard enough in case of dismissal. Penalties, like 
forgone earnings, are in reality often mitigated by gratuitous departure 
payments.  These exit “sweeteners” on top of contractual severance 
packages are highly criticized to be not consistent with optimal 
contracting.106 
 
                                            
105 Source: Kaplan (2006), p.26 
106 Cf. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
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In another recent work, Jenter and Kanaan (2008) tried to shed more 
light on incentive effects in conjunction with CEO turnover. Their 
investigation including all firms of the S&P ExecuComp database from 
1993 to 2001 revealed that poor industry and market performance 
significantly increased CEO turnovers. They infer from their results that 
boards do not sufficiently filter out peer group performance when 
deciding about the CEO’s retention. Moreover, underperforming CEOs 
compared to their peers are more vulnerable to forced turnover 
following low industry returns. Their attempt to detect possible 
explanations for the lack of relative performance evaluation did not find 
empirical support. 
 
It is argued that current evidence on CEO tenure suggests that S&P’s 
ExecuComp data may overvalue executive compensation. Options in 
the ExecuComp database are treated as if they have seven years of 
lifetime which overstates its value if CEOs leave the company on an 
average of six years. This of course only holds true under the 
assumption that CEOs face the forfeiture of unvested options and must 
exercise already vested options upon termination of employment.107 
Restricted stock grants may as well be overvalued as ExecuComp treats 
them as fully vested though they generally vest over a period of time. 
The shorter CEO tenure and the increased turnover-performance 
relation may enhance the performance dependency of stock options.108 
 
4.12 Additional Issues and Discussion 
Unravelling the weak pay-performance link documented by the 
majority of research remains a challenge. Nevertheless continuous 
                                            
107 Yermack (2006) notes that only 16% of internal turnovers deviate from this policy 
108 Cf. Kaplan and Minton (2006) 
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interest in this issue exists, which is accompanied by the development 
of further concepts. 
 
Hermalin and Wallace (2001) offer a theoretic explanation for the weak 
relations found between executive pay and company performance. 
They note that the treatment of firms by standard empiricism as if they 
all offer the same compensation scheme may be a possible reason. 
Firms may employ different schemes based on a number of 
heterogeneous dimensions, like firm size, managerial ability, and to 
which degree executive performance can exert influence on firm 
performance. By accounting for heterogeneity in firm compensation 
schemes and by calculating pay-performance relationships for each 
firm individually, they found executive pay to be significantly more 
positively linked to firm performance than standard specification 
revealed. In consideration of the fact that their investigation solely 
focused on a regulated industry (low pay-performance sensitivities in 
general – see utilities above), it would be interesting to explore the 
effect of this alternative specification on other data sets. 
 
It is surprising that in spite of the large amount of literature on this 
issue, little consistence with regards to data collection, statistical 
techniques, samples, moderator, mediator and control variables used 
can be observed.109 Still there might be political, organizational or 
institutional moderators which might not have been addressed 
adequately yet. 
 
With reference to meta-analysis various strength and weaknesses have 
been documented. Meta-analyses offer little bias in the studies 
included, objective weighting of studies, allowance for the examination 
of moderating variables, allowance for the estimation of relationship 
                                            
109 Cf. Tosi et al. (2000); Devers et al. (2007) 
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stability, and the capability to overcome problems of causal, narrative 
reviews of the literature. Possible weaknesses of meta-analysis 
reported are that “poor” studies may bias the results, a bias towards 
published studies, low power in detecting moderating relationships, and 
the role judgments may possibly play in the results.110 
 
The relatively easy accessibility to quantitative data compared to the 
difficulty of gaining access to the “actors” may explain the lack of 
quantitative work on this issue. However, it would probably be 
beneficial to stress this point more deeply. 
 
                                            
110 Cf. Tosi et al. (2000) quoting Schmitt and Klimoski (1991); Wolf  (1986) 
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5. Subjects of Investigation 
5.1 US Based Research 
As mentioned above, the issue of executive compensation is highly 
discussed, not only in the media, but also in research. As the pay-for-
performance literature is mainly based on the US, the question arises, 
if the empirical results can be transferred to any world economy, or if 
they are limited to the United States. In fact, there is little research on 
other national economies, nor on cross-country comparisons. 
Examining the sources included in the study by Rost and Osterloh 
indicates again that it is basically the US that is under investigation. 
Far behind it, some research on performance related pay is attributed 
to the UK, along with individual studies on other countries. 
 
The simple reason why most research is about conditions in the US is 
the lack of data from other economies, due to less restrictive disclosure 
requirements. While in the US the Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) enacted the first disclosure rules already in 1938, in large parts 
of the world details of CEO compensation remained unclear for a long 
time.111 However, the appearance of more and more corporate 
governance codes, in conjunction with more stringent legislation, are 
leading to more transparency of executive compensation around the 
world.112  
 
5.2 Evidence from the UK 
Among European countries the UK has been the outrider in terms of 
disclosure of executive compensation. Still a lot later that in the US, it 
was the Greenbury Report (1995) and the Hampel Report (1998) that 
                                            
111 Cf. Donahue (2008) 
112 Cf. Baird and Stowasser (2002), as an example of Germany and the UK 
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led to more transparency of CEO pay.113 The UK corporate governance 
structure seems to be quite similar to the US one, as both are 
characterized by a one tier board and dispersed ownership. 
Furthermore, common law is predominant in both economies.114 The 
ratio of performance related compensation to total pay is the largest in 
the UK, compared to other European countries. Nevertheless, total 
compensation cannot keep up with sums that CEOs in the US receive. 
In 1997 Disney’s Michael Eisner pocketed more than the top 500 UK 
CEO’s. It might be necessary to have a closer look at the studies 
including the UK to find out if the results of the meta-analysis are in 
any case transferable to the UK. 
 
New disclosure requirements have made comprehensive data from the 
UK available from 1997 onwards. Before that time researchers often 
relied on data from compensation consultants or other surveys.115 In 
his early work Main (1991) additionally used data from annual reports 
to analyze executive pay and performance for 241 British industrial 
companies for 1985. He reports an empirically modest relationship. 
Main, Bruce and Buck (1996) were already able to include data on 
stock options. Based on a small sample of 60 companies they analyzed 
data from 1981 to 1989. They expanded the literature by not only 
focusing on the CEO but on the total board remuneration. They found 
executive compensation to be statistically significantly connected with 
firm performance. They reported an average boardroom pay increase of 
£0.239 for each extra £1,000 shareholder value. 
 
Benito and Conyon (1999) present pay-for-performance results for the 
years 1985 to 1994. However, they were forced to exclude long-term 
                                            
113 Cf. Conyon and Murphy (2000) 
114 Cf. La Porta et al. (1998) 
115 Cf. Conyon and Murphy (2000) 
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incentives like share options and equity holdings when determining 
CEO pay. Considering this and the fact that they included a large 
sample of firms (also small ones) they found executive pay to increase 
by £1,852 for each increase of 10% in shareholder return. Moreover, 
they report a raise of the pay-performance relation over time. 
 
Conyon and Murphy (2000) compared CEO compensation of the United 
States and the United Kingdom with the available data of long-term 
incentive plans also for the latter. For the year 1997 they found higher 
overall pay-performance sensitivity for the US and more incentives for 
their CEOs to increase shareholder wealth. They attributed these 
results to the fact that CEOs in the UK held less shares of stock, less 
share options, as well as equal or less long-term incentive plan shares. 
CEOs in the US only earned 45% more in terms of cash pay but 190% 
more in total pay than their British counterparts. 
 
Interestingly, the UK represents a country where the mean percentage 
share of equity based compensation to total compensation for a long 
time did not increase that much compared to other economies. 
Referring again to the Conyon and Murphy study, option grants and 
long-term incentive plan shares accounted for 19% of total CEO pay in 
1997 for the 510 largest companies of the UK. 
 
Ferri and Maber (2009) analyzed CEO compensation levels and 
compositions for the years 2000 to 2005 based on a governance 
database compiled by BoardEx for a large sample of about 600 UK 
companies.  Their results show a quite stable share of equity based 
compensation to total pay from the year 2000 to 2004 with a low in 
2002 and the largest increase from 2004 to 2005 (see Table 2).  
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Table 2 : Mean Composition of CEO Pay in the UK 2000-2005116 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 All 
Salary 53%  54%  56%  50%  48%  44%  51%  
Bonus 14%  13%  15%  16%  17%  18%  16%  
Cash Pay 67%  67%  70%  66%  65%  63%  67%  
Stock Options 16%  16%  11%  14%  11%  8%  13%  
Restricted 
Stock  
8%  7%  7%  11%  14%  20%  11%  
Equity Pay  23%  23%  19%  25%  25%  29%  24%  
Other Pay 9%  10%  11%  9%  10%  9%  10%  
Total Pay  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  
 
 
This indicates that pay-for-performance sensitivity comparisons (like 
the one of Conyon and Murphy) have not suddenly led to a more stock-
based compensation structure in other countries.117 Institutional 
conditions might have hindered this development. 
 
A basic question for researchers is whether indeed stock options in the 
US led to higher performance compared to other countries, or whether 
the rising stock market has led managers and boards to support the 
boost of options. From today’s viewpoint it is interesting to know that 
compensation of the highest paid executives in the UK in 2008 
comprised of more than 50% long-term incentives (including all equity-
                                            
116 Source: Ferri and Maber (2009), p.11, 48 
117 Cf. Zhou (1999) for a comparison between Canada and the US. Again a higher pay to performance 
relationship and a higher bonus and option proportion of pay was found for the US. 
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based compensation) which is not too far from the over 60% in the 
US.118 
 
5.3 Limited Non-US Investigations 
As noted, studies on economies outside the US are rare due to lack of 
disclosure. Some Authors have nevertheless tried to find out about pay 
and performance relationships - mainly in their home country - despite 
the difficult informational environment. 
 
Included in the Roth/Osterloh meta-analysis, a study of Cheng and 
Firth (2005) tries to explore top management pay in Hong Kong. While 
data on executive pay from East and South East Asia is limited, Hong 
Kong was one of the first countries to introduce disclosure 
requirements. Firms in this part of the world are largely characterized 
by high family stock ownership. It is of course interesting to analyze 
pay-for-performance under these circumstances. Unfortunately Cheng 
and Firth yet could not include stock options, and data on other 
compensation components remained unclear as well. Thus, the 
explanatory power is limited, as more than 50% of the sample firms 
had already implemented stock options by 1999. 
 
One study included in the meta-analysis investigated compensation 
and performance in Taiwan. As the authors point out, Taiwan has a 
unique stock bonus compensation system which legally dictates that 
firms have to grant their employees stock bonuses when corporate 
earnings are positive, and dividends are paid out. The study does not 
explicitly refer to CEO incentives, but rather to the overall stock bonus 
compensation which makes comparison with other studies difficult.119 
                                            
118 Cf. The Economist (May, 28th 2009) 
119 Cf. Wen Chung, Shin-Rong and Yu-Wen (2006) 
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Data from Canada is represented with one early study only which 
compares this closely linked neighboring country with the United 
States. This work analyzing the early 1990s found similar results for 
this century as the comparison by Conyon and Murphy (2000) for the 
UK and the US mentioned above. The study shows that overall CEO 
compensation, pay-for-performance components as well as pay-for-
performance sensitivity are higher in the United States. Besides US 
companies again outperform their opponents in terms of stock 
prices.120  
 
6. Reasons for Global Incentive Disparities 
It is useful to pose the question, what causes the differences in CEO 
pay between economies. The answer to this question should provide 
insights into the diverse developments of executive compensation, 
possible future conditions and potential limits or chances of 
convergence. Furthermore, it is essential to keep in mind the distinct 
organizational and institutional structures and conditions that executive 
remuneration relies on when confronted with the mainly US based 
literature. 
 
As globalization continuous, accompanied by cross-country mergers 
and acquisitions, the issues of the varying pay structures will grow, 
especially for multinational firms. Ten years ago Gross and Wingerup 
already diagnosed the situation: 
“No longer can HR assume that pay for performance will work in every 
culture, that higher levels of cash pay will motivate employees 
everywhere, or that providing lavish stock options is a desirable retention 
tool globally.”121 
                                            
120 Cf. Zhou (1999) 
121 Gross and Wingerup (1999), p.25-26 
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Figure 4: Average Total CEO Pay in 2008 (in thousand 
EUR)122 
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Figure 4 illustrates differences in CEO pay levels, as well as pay 
compositions, for Germany, Switzerland, France and the United States 
for 2008. It is easily visible that fixed salary does not vary that much 
along these economies and that the clear outlier in terms of equity-
based compensation is the United States. In addition, one can observe 
fundamental variances within the European countries in terms of 
variable pay. While overall compensation is the highest in the DAX, the 
composition of variable pay in the largest German firms differs a lot 
compared to Switzerland and France. German companies pay their 
                                            
122 DWS-Studie zur Vorstandsvergütung 2009 
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CEOs far more in terms of variable cash compensation i.e. bonuses, 
while French and Swiss firms focus much more on equity-based 
remuneration. A cross-country comparison would certainly be a topic 
on its own but it is surely necessary to present an overview of the key 
issues of divergence at this point. 
 
6.1 Culture 
Often mentioned as a main barrier to the globalization of pay, the 
cultural aspect is used in various non-economic studies to explain the 
determination and development of executive compensation. 
 
An example is the study by Tosi and Grackhamer (2004) which points 
out that culture influences compensation practices. They also refer to 
previous comparisons, such as the work of Conyon and Murphy, 
mentioned above, who have analyzed CEO pay in the US and UK. The 
authors argue that this study provides a good example for the view 
that the structural environment does not fully explain differences in 
compensation setting. Both Anglo-Saxon economies are characterized 
by a similar ownership structure, a one-tier board system, and the 
same origin of law. Although other influencing factors (most of them 
will be mentioned below) might play a role, culture may best explain 
the existing differences in CEO compensation. 
 
Tosi and Grackhamer examine the relationship between executive 
compensation and the cultural dimensions of Hofstede (1983) 
according to data of twenty-three countries for the years 1997-2001. 
Hofstede’s “Power Distance” measures, to what extent inequality is 
accepted in a society and how authorities in organizations are 
centralized. Not surprisingly, the authors found a positive relationship 
of power distance to total CEO pay. Interestingly, they postulated that 
power distance was negatively related to the proportion of variable pay 
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to total pay (VC/TC). They argued that every variable pay component 
represents risk and that powerful CEOs would therefore aim to reduce 
performance related pay. In effect, the results were contradictory to 
their hypothesis; the authors explained the discrepancy by the fact that 
firms do not use variable pay components to transfer the risk of poor 
performance. They indicate that their findings support the managerial 
power theory, where CEOs want to increase their personal wealth. 
 
The second dimension, “Individualism-Collectivism”, shows how self-
interest and individual needs are placed above those of groups or 
organizations. People in collectivist countries are born into in-groups 
and share the values and beliefs of this group. The positive relation of 
both CEO total compensation and variable compensation to total 
compensation to individualism have led Tosi and Grackhamer to 
assume that these findings reflect in part the tournament theory, which 
basically awards personal success. They argue that in individualistic 
countries like the US, the transfer of performance risk is evident to 
motivate CEOs. 
 
High “Uncertainty Avoidance” as the third dimension indicates that 
people prefer rules and standard procedures to protect themselves from 
the unpredictable. Not surprisingly, the authors found a negative 
relationship between uncertainty avoidance and the proportion of 
variable pay to total pay. Again, this reflects the preference to avoid 
risk for the CEO through variable compensation. 
 
With regard to the last dimension, “Masculinity-Femininity”, the 
authors did not establish any link to the proportion of variable to total 
compensation.  It is important to note that the macroeconomic and 
corporate governance variables, to be discussed later, might also be 
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affected by culture itself, a fact that was also stressed by the authors 
as a caveat to their results.123 
 
Embedded somewhere in the dimensions of Hofstede are the 
circumstances which other authors emphasized as influencing the 
differences in compensation practices. Referring again to the 
comparison of the US and the UK by Conyon and Murphy, Hofstede fails 
to provide many answers to the cultural question. Both countries 
scored quite similar in his study. An explanation might be the different 
“outrage constraints” which take effect in contemporary discussions 
about excessive pay and which are supported by media scrutiny.124 
This would fit to the opinion that the US as the “market for superstars” 
125 registers less public outrage. 
 
6.2 Tax 
Referring to taxation issues, one has to consider the income tax paid 
by the executives, as well as corporate tax rates and rules. At present 
a heavy debate has started about a “supertax” of 50% that the British 
Government wants to be levied on bankers’ bonuses, in order to 
moderate short-termed incentives.126 Bonuses may induce managers to 
take higher risk and are therefore viewed as a main cause of the 
financial crisis. It is easily imaginable that such actions lead to 
changing pay compositions. 
 
The income tax level can have effects on the level of CEO pay, as well 
as on its composition. Firms try to introduce pay structures that make 
                                            
123 Cf. Tosi and Greckhamer (2004) 
124 Cf. Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002) 
125 Cf. Conyon and Murphy (2000) quoting Rosen (1981) 
126 Cf. URL: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1c0163c2-eb55-11de-bc99-00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1 
[Dec., 19th 2009] 
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it possible for their leaders to keep as much as possible of what they 
earn. Some studies have shown that low income tax rates are 
correlated with higher executive compensation.127 According to Gross 
and Wingerup (1999) in much of Europe high tax rates on cash pay 
lead to the use of perquisites and other non-cash based benefits, to 
remunerate company’s CEOs. This makes incentive based 
compensation and its performance effect more elusive. 
 
Much discussed is the proposition that tax rules have a serious 
influence on the use of stock options. It is widely believed that the 
special treatment of stock options has at least partly contributed to the 
massive use of this form of compensation in the US. Gains from 
exercised share options are deductable as ordinary business expenses. 
On the other hand the deductibility of non-performance-based pay 
components (salaries, restricted stock and discretionary bonuses) is 
limited to $1 million in the United States.128 However, some authors 
doubt that taxation policies have had a great impact on the boost of 
stock options in the US and argue that other factors played a more 
important role.129 
 
6.3 Law 
Various factors that are influencing CEO pay level also have an effect 
on the composition of executive remuneration. The same applies to 
matters of law. The financial crisis has raised calls on a broad basis for 
stricter legislation. Critics argue that short-termed incentives have 
been emphasized too much. Law can indeed have a strong impact on 
compensation setting. In Germany for example, the legal minimum 
holding period for stock options was doubled from two to four years 
                                            
127 Cf. Abowd  and Bognanno(1995); Cheffins (1997) 
128 Cf. Conyon and Murphy (2000) 
129 Cf. Hall and Liebman (2000) 
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recently. Furthermore bonuses have to be set in a way to make them 
more long-term oriented.130 This would be to the disadvantage of CEOs 
who are short-term interested and might lead to reconsiderations of 
pay structures. 
 
Law can also determine disclosure requirements. While especially in 
Continental Europe some criticize the lack of disclosure of executive 
compensation, others assert that more disclosure would lead to an 
Americanization of pay. This view is based on the above mentioned 
“ratchet-effect”, which continuously tends to raise executive 
compensation. “Soft laws” like corporate governance codes generally 
treat executive compensation superficially, most of them only with 
some advice to link pay to performance.131 
 
Accounting Standards generated by private organizations like the US 
Financial Accounting Standards Boards (FASB) are considered soft laws 
as well. Different treatments of pay components may stimulate or curb 
the use of these instruments. Hall and Murphy (2003), as just one of 
many examples, value the special treatment of stock options under the 
US accounting rules as an additional contribution to the growth of 
option grants. For a long time no accounting expense was recorded for 
options, which may have obscured recognition of their economic costs. 
 
Feng and Tian (2009) picked up this approach and analyzed the use of 
equity incentives after options expensing became mandatory in the US. 
They state that, although the obligation effectively was introduced after 
June 15, 2005, firms started to prepare in 2002 by changing their 
incentive plans. Basically, they try to explain why the median CEO 
option incentives increased by a rate of 25% a year from 1993 to 2001, 
                                            
130 Cf. DSW Studie zur Vorstandsvergütung 2009 
131 Cf. Cheffins (2003) 
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but then started to decrease a year after 2001 by 17% yearly till 2005. 
They controlled for several firm and CEO characteristics as well as for 
market and economic events like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the 
backdating scandal and the 2000 stock market crash, and found that 
mandatory option expensing had a significant impact on the use of 
stock options. The impact was larger for high incentive firms, which 
might have overused this form of compensation. 
 
6.4 Additional Factors 
Conyon and Schwalbach (2000) compared executive compensation in 
Europe and found that countries with a two-tier board structure 
(Germany, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland) have a 
higher share of CEO cash compensation than economies characterized 
by a one-tier board structure (UK, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Belgium). 
Updates on these issues would be desirable. 
 
According to the incentive theory it seems logical that the shareholder 
structure influences compensation setting. Nakazato, Ramseyer and 
Rasmusen (2008), as an example, argue that due to the control of 
large shareholders Japanese firms do not have that much need for 
incentive-based compensation. This would again mean that both 
practices, monitoring and incentives, allow for the disciplining of 
managers. 
 
It is obvious that variances in governance and ownership structures 
basically lead to the often discussed differentiations between Anglo-
Saxon and Continental European countries or Japan, but do not explain 
differences within these cultural clusters. Referring once again to the 
US – UK comparison, some authors claim that US CEOs are more 
rewarded for risk. The first argument is that CEOs in other countries, as 
for example in the UK, are more risk averse, trying to avoid variable 
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pay which entails much more risk. Secondly, some authors mention 
that US CEOs might have more responsibilities, more decision rights 
and more influence over corporate results, than for example CEOs in 
the UK.132 
 
There are certainly some more factors that might influence CEO 
compensation setting in various ways. The size of the economy, 
collective bargaining or the stage of development of capital markets 
might play a role as well, the latter especially for firms granting equity-
based incentives. Generally we see that various criteria drive CEO pay 
level, composition, and its incentive effect. Moreover, the review 
recommends caution in a free transfer of the US results to other 
economies. 
 
Unfortunately, international comparisons of real pay to performance 
relationships are scarce. The trend towards an Americanization of 
executive compensation may have come to a standstill, particularly due 
to the current crisis. Many voices attribute the financial turmoil to 
flawed incentive compensation, particularly at Wall Street corporations.  
 
                                            
132 Cf. Conyon and Murphy (2000) 
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7. Behavioral Impacts of Incentive Compensation 
According to agency theory, executive compensation ought to provide 
the appropriate incentives for managers to increase shareholder value. 
The majority of the compensation literature examines the indirect 
impact of pay on performance without particularly considering 
executive behavior.133 
 
It has been shown that due to flaws in compensation schemes 
executive behavior might deviate from what is optimal for 
shareholders. Components in compensation contracts aiming at 
manager-shareholder interest alignment might simultaneously leave 
space for opportunistic behavior of executives. More recently, 
researchers also have tried to identify the behavioral effects of 
contracting structures. Some evidence of behavioral patterns that 
negatively influence shareholder-manager goal alignment - like option 
backdating or dividend policy - has already been discussed. Other 
subjects of heavy interest will be reviewed below. 
 
7.1 Self-Selection 
The process of self-selection is based on the assumption that 
individuals know their abilities and select their employers accordingly. 
Oversimplified, the argument is that strong incentive-based pay 
components attract individuals who believe themselves to possess the 
skills to perform well enough to earn the payoffs from these 
performance contracts. Individuals, who believe that they are not able 
to achieve the payoffs, will perceive the expected compensation as too 
low.134 
 
                                            
133 Cf. Devers (2007) 
134 Cf. Wruck (2000) 
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Performance pay provides employees with extrinsic motivation. It is 
therefore argued that incentive compensation schemes attract 
extrinsically motivated individuals, who are mainly motivated by 
pecuniary awards, instead of individuals who draw their motivation 
from doing his or her duty, and who are therefore intrinsically 
motivated.135  
 
Rynes et al. (2005) summarize some literature on this issue. 
Accordingly, incentive compensation is more attractive to those higher 
in academic achievement (Trank et al. [2002]), need for achievement 
(Bretz et al. [1989]) and self-efficacy (Cable and Judge [1994]). 
Banker et al. (2001) found that the implementation of performance-
based incentive plans attracts and retains more productive employees. 
 
Interestingly, Dunford et al. (2005) noted that job searching was 
positively related to the percentage of underwater options held by 
executives. They argued that the risk associated with underwater 
options lead executives to seek new job possibilities rather than to 
increase effort. Rost et al. (2008) argue that the trend to hire new 
CEOs externally, i.e. from outside the company, reflects the self-
selection process. They suppose that the CEO position is less attractive 
for intrinsically motivated persons. 
 
7.2 Earnings management 
Scholars have been engaged in the detection of possible side effects of 
executive compensation. A major issue in this context is the 
opportunistic earnings management hypothesis, which suggests that 
managers use information asymmetries to report corporate results in 
                                            
135 Cf. Rost and Osterloh (2009) quoting Bohnet and Oberholzer-Gee (2000); Backes-Gellner 
and Wolff (2001); Osterloh and Frey (2005). 
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ways to increase their personal benefit.136 The cost to firms engaged in 
earnings management come in the form of litigation risk. The 
announcement of accounting fraud involvement of firms may lead to 
considerable losses in shareholder value. Dechow et al. (1995) found 
for their sample an average shareholder wealth loss of 9%. Managers 
involved additionally face loss of reputation. 
 
Authors found that incentives for executives to manipulate earnings by 
using discretionary accruals vary with compensation and corporate 
governance arrangements. Gao and Shrieves (2002) report that 
discretionary accruals are lower the higher a manager’s salary. They 
argue that base salary does therefore rather provide an incentive not to 
engage in earnings management, because of the possible costs 
associated with it. In terms of bonuses, Gao and Shrieves document a 
positive and significant relationship with the use of discretionary 
accruals, which is consistent with earlier results.137 
 
More recently, scholars have particularly been interested in the impact 
of stock and option holdings on the misreporting of corporate results. It 
is believed that equity-based compensation has been a main driver of 
aggressive accounting practices, as the rise in accounting fraud goes 
hand in hand with the increase in stock-based pay.138 Burns and Kedia 
(2006) compared firms that restated financial statements - as their 
original statements were not in accordance with GAAP - with firms that 
did not restate. They note that the greater the sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to stock performance emerging from stock options, the greater 
is the probability of earnings management. Additionally, they found no 
                                            
136 Cf. Chan et al. (2001); Gao and Shrieves (2002) 
137 Cf. Healy (1985) 
138 Cf. Cohen et al. (2005); Cheng and Warfield (2004); Bergstresser and Philippon (2006); Burns and 
Kedia (2006) 
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association between equity and restricted stock grants and 
restatements. Their results are similar to other findings. 
 
Gao and Shrieves (2002) conclude that stock options and the intensity 
of stock options are significantly positively related to earnings 
management, measured as the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals. They found as well no significant impact of restricted stock on 
misreporting, except for the incentive intensity of restricted stock. It is 
argued that, in contrast to options, the linear payoffs of restricted stock 
to the value of firm stock movements limit the incentives for managers 
to engage in earnings management.139 Not surprising and uniform are 
the results for long-term incentive plans. Due to their long-term effects 
on CEO wealth they are not associated with short-term earnings 
manipulation. 
 
Empirical evidence from the literature suggests that the structure of 
the compensation contract impacts managers’ behavior to engage in 
earnings management. Furthermore, it is shown that different elements 
of executive pay provide different incentives for earnings management, 
but that the positive effect of stock options on misreporting far exceeds 
the impact of other compensation components. Therefore, the relation 
between stock options and aggressive accounting is of strong interest 
to scholars. 
 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) document that periods of high 
accruals are periods when CEOs and other insiders are exercise 
unusually large quantities of options and sell large quantities of shares. 
McAnally et al. (2008) report that even anticipated option grants lead 
to misreporting. They found that just before large stock option grants 
CEOs are more likely to miss critical earnings targets. 
                                            
139 Cf. Gao and Shrieves (2006) 
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Authors noted that discretionary accruals in one period need to be 
reversed in subsequent periods, which leads to a tradeoff between 
current and future earnings reporting.140 This fact might in the long run 
somehow limit managers’ potential to increase personal wealth. 
However, managers are aware of the reversal and might try to report 
higher earnings in periods when the share of stock options on 
compensation is relatively high, or when discretionary positive accruals 
can lead to the reporting of positive instead of negative earnings.141 
 
Burns and Kedia (2006) argue that the issue of misreporting 
contributed to the increasing use of equity and restricted stock instead 
of stock options by large corporations like General Electric and 
Microsoft.142 While Kaplan and Minton (2006) conclude that their 
findings of shorter CEO tenures over time might create incentives for 
managers to engage in earnings management, several studies have 
proofed that enhanced corporate governance significantly reduces the 
probability of earnings management. 
 
7.3 Risk taking and Strategic Decisions 
Executives are assumed to be risk averse, as they are overinvested in 
their own firms with their personal wealth and human capital.143 
Shareholders, on the other hand, are assumed to be risk neutral to 
investment decisions as they are able to diversify their wealth across 
firms. Agency costs may arise due to managerial avoidance of risky but 
possibly profitable projects.144 Therefore scholars point to the necessity 
                                            
140 Cf. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995); Gao and Shrieves (2002) 
141 Cf. Gao and Shrieves (2002) 
142 Cf. Burns and Kedia (2006) quoting The Financial Times, September 19, 2003, ‘‘The Largest Groups rein 
in Excessive deals,’’ by Adrian Michaels. 
143 Cf. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
144 Cf. Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) 
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to align the dissimilar risk preferences of managers and 
shareholders.145 It has been argued that convex payoffs, which are 
particularly inherent in stock options, are a useful means for risk 
preference alignment.146 
 
Datta et al. (2001) share this view based on their analysis of stock 
option compensation and managerial acquisition behavior. They 
document greater post-acquisition firm risk if the acquirer’s executive 
compensation contains higher shares of stock options. They further 
found option pay to be negatively related to acquisition premiums. 
Similarly, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2001) reported riskier investment 
decisions (measured as the coefficient of variation in expected future 
cash flows) associated with stock option pay in the oil and gas industry. 
 
The literature embodies a large quantity of theoretical and empirical 
contributions on this issue. It would go beyond the scope of this work 
to list the numerous and differing conclusions of the studies.147 An 
outline of the results indicates that incentive compensation does exert 
influence on managerial attitudes towards risk. These attitudes in turn 
lead to strategic decisions which might improve goal alignment, or 
significantly deviate from what is optimal for shareholders.148 In fact, 
work on this issue leads to the assumption that performance pay and 
risk have a complex relation, or as Nohel and Todd (2001) concluded 
for investment decisions: 
“…managerial incentives to invest are multi-dimensional and highly 
sensitive to option strike prices, the manager’s wealth, degree of 
diversification, risk aversion, and career concerns.”149 
                                            
145 Cf. Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) 
146 Cf. Jensen and Meckling (1976); Guay (1999), among others 
147 See Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006); or Devers et al. (2007) for a review 
148 Cf. Nohel and Todd (2001), who found that due to over and under-investment, hurdle rates range from 
20 percentage points below to 35 percentage points above rates of return required by shareholders. 
149 Nohel and Todd (2001) p.21-22 
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Considering the financial crisis 2007-2009 the prevailing notion is that 
modern compensation schemes increase managerial incentives to take 
risk.150 
 
                                            
150 Cf. Landskroner and Raviv (2009) 
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8. Considering Human Nature  
Agency theory does not distinguish between individual personality 
differences. It is assumed that a lack of controls result in opportunistic 
behavior of agents.151 However, this view may draw a too simplistic 
picture of complex human behavior.152 Economists have largely ignored 
this issue. 
 
Based on the critical voices regarding the oversimplification of human 
action, Fong and Tosi (2007) tested the assumption that unequal 
motivation towards opportunism among individuals should lead to 
differing effects of agency controls. Among the “Big Five” personality 
factors they selected conscientiousness as the characteristic shown to 
have the greatest influence on individual performance. Attributes 
associated with conscientiousness indicate that conscientious 
individuals are less likely to behave opportunistically and engage in 
shirking at the cost of the principal. Agency controls (incentive 
alignment and monitoring) should therefore have little effect on 
conscientious agents.  
 
The authors also distinguish between effort and performance. This is an 
important point given the fact that agency theory focuses on agent 
effort, but empiricists basically measure performance. Though certainly 
related, effort, however, does not guarantee performance.153 
 
They tested their assumptions by means of a field study including 150 
students. Overall their results revealed that less conscientious agents 
reacted to incentives by increasing their effort and performance, while 
incentives had little or no effect on the effort and performance of highly 
                                            
151Cf.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
152 Cf. Donaldson (1990a, 1990b);  Doucouliagos (1994) 
153 Cf. Fong and Tosi (2007) quoting Christen et al. (2006) 
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conscientious agents. Thus, the absence of incentive alignment 
mechanisms leads to opportunistic behavior by low-conscientious 
individuals. Those agents require incentives to reduce or avoid moral 
hazard and to increase performance. 
 
On the other hand, there is no need for incentive alignment as far as 
conscientious individuals are hired. Besides some limitations of the 
study, Fong and Tosi suggest that the poor results of the pay-for-
performance literature may to some degree be explained by not 
accounting for human nature as a moderator variable.154 
 
                                            
154 Cf. Fong and Tosi (2007) 
72 
9. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation 
Based on pay-for-performance criticism from psychological economists 
and motivational psychologists, Rost and Osterloh (2009) support the 
notion that the crowding-out effects of intrinsic motivation by external 
incentives represent a serious argument against performance pay. The 
trade-off between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation was primarily 
reported by Edward L. Deci and has been picked up by others, 
specifically by Bruno S. Frey. A large number of laboratory experiments 
and empirical results support the crowding effect, which contradicts the 
standard economic model.155 
 
It is however necessary to note that the crowding out effect depends 
on certain conditions. Most importantly, the agent must have a high 
intrinsic motivation in the first place. Moreover, the incentive needs to 
be perceived as controlling. If the intervention is perceived as 
informative, intrinsic motivation may be not affected, or even be 
enhanced.156 To affect performance, the loss of intrinsic motivation 
must not be compensated by extrinsic motivation.157 
 
The theory suggests that setting executive compensation requires 
knowledge about the a priori motivation of the agent. Additionally, as 
far as extrinsic motivation could make up for the loss of intrinsic 
motivation, firms need to ask themselves how their managers should 
be motivated. The answer to this question may mainly depend on the 
operational environment and goals of the firm. Indeed, compensation 
in non-profit organizations is less contingent on performance.158 
Managers in non-profit organizations are found to be more intrinsically 
                                            
155 Cf. Deci, Ryan and Koestner (1999), who conducted a comprehensive meta-analysis; or Frey and Jegen 
(2001), who provide an overview of empirical results 
156 Cf. Frey (1998) 
157 Cf. Osterloh and Frey (2000)  
158 Cf. Frey (1997) quoting Roomkin and Weisbrod (1994) 
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motivated which increases the risk of motivation being crowded out by 
performance based compensation.159 
 
Besides the advantages and disadvantages of intrinsic motivation it is 
probably the issue of feasibility to account for all factors influencing 
intrinsically motivated individuals why in practice the focus lies on the 
more understandable and simpler practice of extrinsic rewards.160 
 
                                            
159 Cf. Frey (1997) 
160 Cf. Wruck (2000) 
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10. Final Discussion and Conclusion  
Pay-for-performance has been praised as the instrument capable of 
overcoming the agency problem inherent in the modern corporation. It 
has even gained access into compensation schemes of public 
institutions. Research has however largely been unable to identify a 
significant link between executive compensation and corporate 
performance. The meta-analysis of Rost and Osterloh (2009) provides 
another argument for the weakness of pay-for-performance in aligning 
the interests of managers and shareholders. Based on their results, 
Rost and Osterloh question why this “management fashion” is still 
applied at all, as it has obviously not achieved its intended aims. 
 
Other authors (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried [2004] and Jensen et al. 
[2004]) have expressed strong criticism on current executive 
compensation as well. In opposition to Rost and Osterloh, they believe 
in the management concept per se, but call for urgently required 
improvements in pay scheme designs and corporate governance to 
make the incentives of performance-based compensation work. 
Furthermore, they even provide useful solutions to overcome certain 
flaws in compensation and firm structures. This investigation moreover 
mentions that current pay schemes and governance structures are 
imperfect and leave enough room for improvements.  
 
This might be one possible reason for the ability of performance to 
explain only a minor part of CEO compensation, which stays a fact in 
empiricism and is underlined by the Rost/Osterloh meta-analysis. 
However, the meta-analysis has certain limitations on its own. As 
noted by Rost and Osterloh, it does not allow for a fixed-effect 
approach. Furthermore, the inconsistent data with regards to the CEO 
pay variable have raised difficulties. This fact was accented by this 
review of the underlying studies which additionally has demonstrated 
that the dependent variable is not the only source of heterogeneity 
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among the empirical contributions. Certainly the difference in data 
quality is especially noteworthy but it has been shown that pay-for-
performance studies vary greatly with regards to statistical techniques, 
samples and variables used as well. Furthermore, empiricism lacks 
homogeneity regarding which valuation methods and lags are 
employed. Reviewers have already tried to provide frameworks which 
should guide future research (e.g. Farmer [2008]; Devers et al. 
[2007]) and may contribute to the unraveling of the weak pay-
performance link documented. 
 
In spite of the huge amount of literature on executive compensation 
little attention is given to economies outside the United States. While 
lack of transparency might still hinder detailed investigations this 
review has illustrated that US results are not one to one transferable to 
other economies. Cross-country comparisons reveal that the 
determinants and conditions which drive incentive compensation are 
numerous and vary greatly. In particular multinational companies need 
to consider those differences, when they are faced with compensation 
decisions in their subsidiaries. 
 
Yet, there are observers who argue that executives are well paid for 
performance and that not least the increasing frequency of CEO firings 
affirms this fact.161 However, the current debates in the aftermaths of 
the recent financial crisis oppose this view. Mentioned as a symptom 
and cause of the crisis, pay and governance structures are being 
reconsidered which might be necessary to mitigate the “dark side” of 
incentive compensation and to dismantle deficiently designed pay 
schemes. Some modifications have taken place and others may follow. 
Future research will analyze their fruitfulness before pay-for-
performance is to be buried like other possible management fashions. 
                                            
161 Cf. Steven N. Kaplan at URL: http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/402 [April, 25th 2010] 
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